The US Federal Reserve building, exterior

Why a 2026 Fed rate hike is now the base case: what May’s hot PCE means for US savers, borrowers and retirees

What’s changed: Updated October 15, 2026: September inflation rose to 3.7%, two weeks before the Fed’s next decision. Earlier, October 10: August inflation and September jobs were in, and the Fed’s minutes said most officials expect another hike this year. Full update history.

In short

  • May core PCE came in at 3.4% over the year (and 0.3% on the month), the highest core reading since October 2023. Headline PCE was 4.1%. Core PCE is the Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation gauge, so a two-year high is the opposite of what a rate cut needs.
  • The same morning brought a stronger economy, not a weaker one. The third estimate of first-quarter GDP was revised up to 2.1% annualized from 1.6%, and weekly jobless claims fell to 215,000, beating expectations. Neither number gives the Fed a reason to ease.
  • Markets have moved to price a rate increase, not a cut, as the more likely next move. After the data, futures implied roughly a 73% chance of at least one quarter-point hike by the September meeting, and Bank of America dropped its call for a hold to forecast three hikes this year. A hike is now the market’s base case for 2026.
  • The Fed held its target range at 3.50% to 3.75% on June 16-17, and its own June projections already pointed to a year-end rate near 3.8%, which implies one increase rather than a cut.
  • For households this hardens the higher-for-longer picture. Savings yields near 4% to 5% are more likely to persist, the 30-year fixed mortgage sat at 6.49% in late June, and the same inflation that worries the Fed keeps the 2027 Social Security cost-of-living adjustment elevated.
  • This is two-way risk, not a certainty. One hot month is not a trend, and a clear cooling in the summer data would put a cut back on the table. The next decision is July 29-30.

For most of 2024 and 2025, American savers and borrowers could lean on one assumption: inflation was cooling, the Federal Reserve was cutting, and money would keep getting a little cheaper. That assumption has been unwinding for a few months. On the morning of June 25, a single batch of government data finished the job.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis reported that the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index, the Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, rose 4.1% over the year through May at the headline level, with the core measure that strips out food and energy up 3.4%. That core figure is the highest since October 2023. The same release showed personal income up 0.7% on the month and spending up 0.7% in dollar terms. Minutes earlier, a separate report revised first-quarter economic growth up to 2.1% annualized from 1.6%, and the weekly jobless-claims figure fell to 215,000, better than forecast. Inflation firmer, growth stronger, the job market still tight. For a central bank that needs a reason to cut, none of that helps.

By the close, futures markets were no longer treating the Fed’s next move as a cut. They were pricing a hike, with roughly a 73% chance of at least one quarter-point increase by the September meeting, and Bank of America went further still, dropping its call for a hold and forecasting three quarter-point increases in 2026, in September, October, and December. This piece explains how the base case flipped, what the Fed’s own June projections already told us, and what a 2026 hike risk means in practice for people with savings, mortgages, and retirement accounts. For the fuller story of how the Fed got here, with a new chair and a divided committee, see our earlier piece on Warsh’s first FOMC and the move from rate cuts to a rate hike.

Why core PCE at 3.4% matters more than the headline

There are several inflation gauges, and they are not interchangeable for policy purposes. The Consumer Price Index gets the headlines, but the Fed targets PCE inflation, and within that it watches the core reading most closely because food and energy prices swing too sharply month to month to guide interest-rate decisions. So the number that matters most for the Fed is the one that just hit a two-year high: core PCE at 3.4% over the year, and 0.3% on the month.

Put that against the Fed’s own yardstick. The committee targets 2% PCE inflation over time, and its June projections pencilled in year-end 2026 inflation around 3.6%. May’s 4.1% headline is running above even that raised path, and the core at 3.4% is not yet moving in the right direction. The disinflation that defined 2024 has stalled. When the preferred gauge stops falling and the economy is still growing above 2%, the case for cutting weakens and the case for holding, or leaning toward a hike, gets stronger.

The growth and jobs data pointed the same way

A hot inflation print alongside a weakening economy would leave the Fed with a genuine dilemma, the kind that can still argue for a cut to protect jobs. That is not the picture the June 25 data painted. The third and final estimate of first-quarter GDP was revised up to 2.1% annualized, half a point above the 1.6% second estimate, with the revision driven largely by softer imports (which subtract from measured growth). That removes the recession-risk framing that hovered over the economy earlier in the year.

The labor market told the same story. Initial claims for unemployment benefits fell to 215,000 in the week ending June 20, down from 227,000 and below the roughly 226,000 economists expected. A low and falling claims number says employers are holding on to workers, which keeps wage pressure alive and gives the Fed room to stay restrictive. Growth above trend and a tight job market are exactly the conditions under which a central bank worries more about inflation than about a slowdown.

The Fed’s June meeting already leaned this way

The repricing did not come out of nowhere. At its June 16-17 meeting, the FOMC held its benchmark range at 3.50% to 3.75% on a unanimous vote, but the accompanying Summary of Economic Projections lifted the median expectation for the policy rate at the end of 2026 to about 3.8%. That is above the current range, which means the committee’s own central forecast already implies an increase rather than a cut as the next move. Chair Kevin Warsh used his first meeting to trim the statement and drop the “easing bias” language that had signalled cuts were coming.

So the institution had already shifted its lean before this week’s data arrived. May’s PCE, GDP, and claims numbers did not create the hike case; they confirmed the path the June projections had sketched. That is why the market reaction was a repricing of probability rather than a shock. The question is no longer whether the Fed has stopped cutting. It is whether the next move is a hold that stretches through the year or an actual increase, and the data this week nudged that balance toward the increase.

What “73% odds of a September hike” really means

A market-implied probability is not a forecast from the Fed, and it is not a promise. It is the price traders are collectively putting on an outcome, and it moves with every data release between now and the meeting. Roughly 73% odds of a hike by September means the market thinks an increase is clearly more likely than not, but it also means there is still around a one-in-four chance it does not happen. Two more inflation prints and two more jobs reports land before that meeting, and any of them could shift the number sharply.

This is the part worth holding onto: one hot month is not a trend. The May data hardened a direction, but a clear cooling in the June and July readings, especially if the job market loosens, would pull the cut scenario back into view quickly. The honest framing is two-way risk. The base case has flipped from “cut next” to “hike next,” but it is a lean, not a lock. The next scheduled decision is July 29-30, with September the meeting the market is really watching.

What it means for savers, borrowers, and retirees

The throughline for households is that the one-way-down assumption of the past two years is gone. The environment is better modeled as rates staying around where they are, with a hike as the live risk and a cut as the upside surprise rather than the plan. That lands differently for three groups.

For savers, the elevated yields on high-yield savings accounts and certificates of deposit, broadly in the 4% to 5% range, have already outlasted the forecasts that had them falling through 2025. A Fed that holds or hikes makes it more likely they stick around through 2026. The planning posture shifts from “lock it in before it disappears” to treating these as a normal that may persist for a while.

For mortgage borrowers, the 30-year fixed rate stood at 6.49% in the week ending June 25, little changed and stubbornly above 6%. Mortgage pricing tracks the 10-year Treasury yield, near 4.4% in late June, more than it tracks the Fed’s overnight rate, so waiting for the Fed to deliver cheaper home loans is a weaker plan than it was a year ago. If the Fed is more likely to hike than cut, the case for holding out for a sharply lower rate is thinner.

For retirees and those approaching retirement, higher-for-longer has a genuine upside. Treasury and CD ladders at around 5%, and a 10-year Treasury near 4.4%, offer a positive return above current inflation, and annuity payouts, which price off long-term rates, remain at their most attractive in over a decade. The same inflation that is keeping the Fed cautious is also lifting the 2027 Social Security cost-of-living adjustment, even as it worsens the program’s longer-run funding math, a tension we cover in our Social Security 2027 COLA and Trust Fund piece.

Frequently asked questions

What is PCE inflation, and why does the Fed watch it instead of CPI?

PCE stands for Personal Consumption Expenditures. It is an inflation measure published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis that tracks the prices households actually pay across a broad basket of goods and services. The Fed targets 2% PCE inflation rather than the more familiar Consumer Price Index because PCE adjusts for how people change their spending and covers a wider range of costs. The core version, which excludes food and energy, is the gauge the Fed leans on most for interest-rate decisions because it filters out the most volatile prices.

Does a hot PCE print mean the Fed will definitely hike in September?

No. It raises the odds, and the market moved to price a hike as more likely than not, but it is a probability, not a decision. The Fed sees two more inflation reports and two more jobs reports before the September meeting, and a clear cooling in that data could shift the picture back toward a hold or even a cut. The base case has flipped toward a hike, but it remains two-way risk.

If the Fed hikes, will my mortgage rate go up?

Not directly. Fixed mortgage rates track the 10-year Treasury yield and the broader bond market more than the Fed’s short-term rate. A Fed hike can push yields around, but the link is indirect, which is also why a Fed cut does not automatically lower mortgage costs. The practical point is that waiting for the Fed to deliver a much cheaper mortgage is a less reliable plan now than it was when cuts looked certain.

Are high savings rates likely to last into 2027?

They are more likely to persist than the 2024-25 consensus expected. A Fed that holds or hikes keeps short-term rates elevated, which supports the competition for deposits that drives high-yield savings and CD rates. Nothing is guaranteed, but the higher-for-longer case strengthened with this week’s data.

When does the Fed next decide on rates?

The Federal Open Market Committee next meets on July 29-30, 2026, followed by a meeting in September. The September meeting is the one the market is watching most closely for a possible rate increase, because more inflation and jobs data will be in hand by then.

The Savvy Investor’s take

The tidy story of 2024 and 2025, inflation easing and the Fed cutting, is now firmly behind us. May’s core PCE at a two-year high, sitting on top of an economy that grew faster than first thought and a job market that is still tight, has done what the Fed’s June projections hinted at: it has made a 2026 rate increase the more likely next move rather than a cut. The market agrees, which is why it now prices a hike as the base case heading into September.

The useful posture for most households is to plan around rates staying broadly where they are, treat a hike as the live risk, and treat a cut as a pleasant surprise rather than the plan. Where attractive yields are on offer, in Treasuries, CDs, and savings accounts, they are worth more attention now than during the cuts-are-coming years. Mortgage decisions are better made on the maths in front of you than on a cutting cycle that may not arrive on schedule. And it is worth keeping the two-way nature of this in mind: a single soft summer would change the conversation again. The July 29-30 and September meetings are where most of this gets answered.

Related Savvy Investor reading

Key sources

Information, not advice. This article explains the May 2026 PCE, GDP, and jobless-claims data released on June 25, 2026, the Federal Reserve’s June projections, and the market’s repricing toward a possible 2026 rate increase. Interest rates, bond yields, and Fed expectations move daily; the figures here are point-in-time. The roughly 73% probability of a September hike is a market-implied estimate, not a Fed commitment. This is general educational information, not personal financial, tax, or investment advice. Savvy Investor Guide is not authorized to provide regulated financial advice. Consider your own circumstances and, where appropriate, consult a qualified professional before making decisions about savings, mortgages, or retirement accounts.

Update history: October 15 back to June 28, 2026

Update, October 15, 2026: September inflation came in higher. Consumer prices rose 3.7% in the 12 months to September, up from 3.4% in August, and 2.6% excluding food and energy, up from 2.4%, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported on October 14. Energy prices were up 20.4% on the year. The Fed’s Beige Book, published the same day, said that “Higher oil prices permeated all District reports.” Estimates of the chance of a rate rise on October 28 moved a long way through the day and differ between sources, so we are not printing a single figure. On the Treasury’s daily yield curve the 2-year closed at 4.82% and the 10-year at 5.19% on October 14. The next decision is on October 28.

Update, October 10, 2026: the data came in, and the Fed still expects to raise again. August PCE inflation, published on September 30, was 3.4% over the year and 3.0% excluding food and energy, with the core measure up 0.2% on the month (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Those figures do not line up directly with the May numbers in this article, because the release included revisions to the BEA’s methodology. On the revised data, said Governor Christopher Waller, 12-month core inflation “has been between roughly 2.5 percent and 3.0 percent since the spring of 2024. This is obviously higher than we want, above our target, and not showing sufficient progress.” The September jobs report on October 2 showed payrolls up 29,000 and unemployment at 4.2%, with July and August revised down by a combined 60,000 (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

The Fed’s own account points the same way. The minutes of the September meeting, published on October 7, record that “all participants supported raising the target range for the federal funds rate 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent,” and that “most participants assessed that another increase in the target range for the federal funds rate would likely be appropriate by year end.” In a speech on October 8 Waller said: “If the economic data continue to come in as expected, I anticipate additional hikes to support a timelier return of inflation to our 2 percent goal.” He added: “The hikes do not need to come at consecutive meetings, but they should be in place in an acceptable period of time.” By his reading of futures prices on October 7, traders saw an 85% chance of at least one more increase by the December meeting and nearly a 20% chance of two.

Bond yields have stayed near their highs. On the Treasury’s daily yield curve the 10-year closed at 5.31% on October 5 and 5.24% on October 9, with the 2-year at 4.80%. The 30-year fixed mortgage rate reached 7.40% in the week ending October 8, which our mortgage explainer covers. September consumer prices are due on October 14, and the next decision is on October 28.

Update, September 25, 2026: the Fed is now talking about the next hike. On September 23 Governor Michael Barr said that “In my base case, further policy adjustments are likely to be needed to ensure inflation comes down to target in a timely fashion” (Federal Reserve speech). The next day New York Fed President John Williams said market pricing suggests “it’s likely that another rate hike may be appropriate by the end of the year,” and added: “That seems to me a reasonable way of thinking about it. But we have to see.” CME Group’s FedWatch tool put the probability of an October hike at 77.5% on September 24, up from around 53% a day earlier, as CNBC reported. That is one gauge on one day, and it has moved with every release since June.

Bond yields moved with them. On the Treasury’s daily yield curve the 2-year went from 4.71% on September 22 to 4.87% on September 24, and the 10-year from 4.96% to 5.18%, its highest close since July 2007. The 30-year fixed mortgage rate crossed 7% in the same week, which our mortgage explainer covers. The next decision is October 27 to 28, with the August PCE inflation report due on September 30 before it. The notes that follow used to sit at the top of this article and have moved here unchanged.

Update, September 18, 2026: the hike this article called the base case happened. On September 16 the FOMC “decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent”. The committee’s median projection now has the rate at 4.1% at the end of 2026, up from 3.8% in June, which implies one more quarter-point increase this year. Sources: Federal Reserve statement; summary of economic projections.

Chair Warsh gave three reasons at his press conference, as CNBC reported: the economy strengthened, inflation did not slow, and geopolitical tensions intensified. On prices he drew a line between what the Fed can and cannot do: “We cannot affect any individual price,” but it can “ensure that any change in relative prices don’t broaden out.”

Update, September 5, 2026: three named policymakers, one data print, and every one of them is conditioning on it. Governor Christopher Waller, in remarks published September 3, said: “If this continues in the data due over the next two weeks, I would be inclined to support holding the target for the federal funds rate at its current setting.” The conditional is doing the work, because the same remarks add that “If the incoming data for August show this improvement has been fleeting, then it may be appropriate to raise the policy rate when the FOMC meets on September 15 and 16.”

Governor Michael Barr framed it identically two days earlier, approaching from the other side. On September 1 he said: “If trends in the data give me some confidence that inflation is moderating on a path to 2 percent, then I think we can take a bit more time to assess our policy stance. However, if inflation appears not to be moderating sufficiently, then I think we should act decisively to raise rates.” He also described inflation as “too high”, and said it has been so for over five years.

So this reads less as a split than as a committee that has handed one decision to one number. Both men point at the same August data, and the August CPI print lands on September 11, four days before the meeting opens. Market pricing has followed the rhetoric rather than led it, and the available readings disagree enough that a single probability would be false precision: through the week of September 1 they ranged from the mid fifties to about two thirds in favour of a hike, with prediction markets sitting materially below futures-implied pricing. None of this settles the thesis of this article. What has changed is that the argument now has names attached to both sides of it, and a date.

Update, August 20, 2026: the July minutes are out, and they settle a number this article had to infer. The Federal Reserve released the minutes of the July 28 to 29 meeting on August 19. The vote is now stated in the Fed’s own words: “Nine members agreed to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 3-1/2 to 3-3/4 percent”, and “Three members voted against the decision to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate, preferring an increase of 25 basis points.” The three were Beth M. Hammack, Neel Kashkari and Lorie K. Logan.

Why that sentence matters here. The July 30 note below reported the same three dissenters but flagged the nine as derived rather than sourced, because the Fed’s statement names only the members who vote against and publishes no roster of those voting for. The count came from the twelve filled seats. The minutes now give the nine directly, so the split can be cited instead of inferred. The caveat attached to it below can be read as closed.

The tone is harder than the hold suggests. The minutes record that “Many participants assessed that policy tightening would likely be necessary if inflation did not decline.” That is a conditional, not a commitment, but it is the language of a committee arguing about when rather than whether. The next decision is September 15 to 16, 2026. Read alongside the thinner market odds in the August 13 note, the picture is a hawkish committee that has not yet been given the inflation print it needs.

Update, August 13, 2026: July inflation landed exactly on expectations, and the September hike case has thinned again. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported on August 12 that consumer prices rose 0.1% in July, with core prices up 0.2%. The annual rates came in at 3.4% headline and 2.5% core, both a tenth lower than June, and all four readings matched the Dow Jones consensus. Shelter accounted for roughly two thirds of the monthly increase. Energy fell 1.5% on the month but remains 14.7% higher than a year ago, with gasoline up 24.6% over the same period.

What that does to the odds discussed below. The roughly 73% probability of a September hike used throughout this article was market pricing from late June, and it has not held. Traders “further cut the probability for a September rate hike, lowering the odds to 42%”, per CME Group’s FedWatch gauge as reported on August 12, down from about 52% two days earlier. That is one gauge on one day, and it has moved with every print since June, so treat it as the current reading rather than a settled number. September now looks closer to a coin flip than to the base case set out below. Source: CNBC, July 2026 CPI report.

What has not changed. Thinner odds are a question of timing, not a reversal. The case below rests on inflation sitting above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target, and at 3.4% headline it still does. Ellen Zentner of Morgan Stanley Wealth Management summed up the market’s reading: “In-line inflation will keep the ‘no need to hike rates’ narrative that took hold after last week’s jobs report intact.” Treasury yields barely moved on the release, with the 10-year at 4.69%. For savers and borrowers the practical position is unchanged from what this piece describes: the Fed is holding rather than cutting, and the live argument is about when it moves next, not which direction.

Update, July 30, 2026: the Fed held, and three officials voted to raise. The FOMC left its target range unchanged on July 29. From the statement: “The Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 3-1/2 to 3-3/4 percent, in support of the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate.” It also closed its economic assessment with a flat five-word sentence that is worth noting on its own: “The Committee will deliver price stability.”

The dissent is the actual news. The statement records that “Voting against the monetary policy action were Beth M. Hammack, Neel Kashkari, and Lorie K. Logan, who preferred to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point at this meeting.” The Committee has twelve voting members and every seat is currently filled, so that is a nine to three vote. Worth being precise here: the Fed named only the dissenters and did not publish a list of who voted in favour, so the nine is arithmetic on a full committee rather than a figure the Fed printed.

What this does to the case set out below. A hold is not a rejection of the hike thesis; a quarter of the voting committee tried to deliver one at this meeting. But it is a correction to the shape of it. This article’s argument, and the pre-meeting reads generally, assumed a hawkish minority of about two. It was three, and Kashkari was on nobody’s list. A bloc that size does not usually shrink quietly. The July 27 note below stands exactly as written: the two camps pricing this meeting never converged, and a hold with three dissents is not a clean win for either of them.

Update, July 27, 2026. The July 29 meeting is two days away, and the two camps that price it have not converged. Futures-implied pricing on the morning of July 27 puts the meeting at 65.7% hold against 34.3% for a quarter-point hike. Polymarket, on nearly $97 million of volume, has it at 79.8% no change against 20.1% for a hike. That is a gap of roughly 14 points between the futures market and the prediction market, and it has stayed open rather than narrowing as the meeting approaches. Anyone quoting you a single number for the odds of a July hike this week is picking a camp.

The week’s path is worth seeing whole, because it is not a straight line. Hike odds on futures ran from about 24% on July 22 up to roughly 39% on July 25, then back down to 34.3% today. The move up was the Middle East. The move back down is the de-escalation: the United States and Iran have both paused strikes, with Tehran saying it stopped its retaliatory operations after Washington did, and the pause has now held into a third day. Brent crude has fallen to about $91.70, down more than 5% on the day, though it is still around a quarter higher than it was a month ago. The 10-year Treasury has eased to about 4.64% and the 30-year sits near 5.12%.

The mechanics set out below do not change. Oil feeds headline inflation, headline inflation feeds expectations, and expectations are what a Fed worried about its credibility watches. What has changed is the direction of that push over the last three days. A pause is not a settlement, and the inflation data the committee reacts to lags the oil price by months, so a calmer week in the Gulf does not retroactively cool the prints that got it here.

Update, July 22, 2026. September is now firmly the market’s lean, and July is no longer a settled hold. As of the morning of July 22, market-implied pricing puts the September 16 meeting at roughly 68% for a hike (about 54% a quarter point, 14% a half point) against 32% for a hold, while the July 29 meeting still leans hold at about 76%, weaker than the roughly 84% hold priced at the start of the week. Oil is doing the pushing. US strikes on Iran ran an eleventh consecutive night on July 21, and a separate supply shock has stacked on top: drone strikes on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk have disrupted roughly 1.58 million barrels a day of Kazakh crude exports, about 1% of global supply. Brent traded near $94 to $95 on July 22, a fourth straight day of gains. Mediators have proposed a 10-day ceasefire to revive the interim deal, but nothing is in effect. As always, these are market-implied probabilities, not Fed decisions.

Update, July 17, 2026. The July scare has unwound, but do not read it as an all-clear. President Trump proposed a 20% toll on Strait of Hormuz cargo on July 13 and dropped it on July 14, and with that specific threat off the table, market-implied odds of a July 29 hike fell back to around 9%. September has not followed it down: CME futures on July 16 put the September 16 meeting at roughly a coin flip (about 51% hold, 44% a quarter-point hike, 5% a half-point), so September, not July, is now the meeting that matters. The catch is that the toll reversal is not the same as the conflict ending. US forces struck Iran for a sixth consecutive night on July 16, and Qatar intercepted Iranian fire on July 17, so the shooting war escalated even as the toll came off, and Brent is still near $84 to $85. In short, the near-term Fed risk eased while the oil and geopolitical risk rose. As always, these are market-implied probabilities, not Fed decisions.

Update, July 15, 2026. The rate path has whipsawed. June CPI, released July 14, came in cool (headline 3.5% year on year, core 2.6%), and the odds of a July Fed hike briefly collapsed to around 17 to 20%. Within hours they reversed. A sharp escalation in the conflict between the US and Iran around the Strait of Hormuz pushed Brent crude to a one-month high near $85, and market-implied odds of a hike climbed back to roughly 43 to 46% for the July 29 meeting and about 62% for September. The lesson is that a single oil shock can flip an inflation narrative overnight: the June disinflation was energy-led, and that energy relief is now unwinding. Chair Warsh, testifying to Congress this week, has kept to his practice of not signaling the path in advance. As always, these are market-implied probabilities, not Fed decisions.

Update, July 9, 2026. The minutes of the Fed’s June 16-17 meeting, released on July 8, leaned hawkish and pushed the odds back toward a hike after the early-July jobs wobble. The record shows the committee deliberately dropped the “easing bias” language that had signalled cuts, and that “a few participants” argued there was already a case for raising rates, though all supported holding at that meeting. Participants described inflation as still well above the 2% goal. A fresh oil-price spike, tied to tension around the Strait of Hormuz, added to that worry: market-implied odds of a September hike rose again, and the 10-year Treasury yield climbed toward 4.6%, a multi-week high. The near-term picture is now finely balanced between a hold and a hike, and it will keep moving with the June CPI report on July 14 and the next jobs reports. As always, these are market-implied probabilities, not Fed decisions.

Update, 3 July 2026: The June jobs report, released on 2 July, came in soft and has weakened the case for a July rate rise. US employers added just 57,000 jobs, well below the roughly 115,000 expected, and the April and May figures were revised down by a combined 74,000. The unemployment rate edged down to 4.2%, but mainly because people left the workforce (participation fell to about 61.5%, close to a five-year low), so it is not the strength signal it looks. Markets moved quickly: CME FedWatch odds of a rise at the 29 to 30 July meeting fell from about 30% to about 22%, making a hold the clear favourite, and the two-year Treasury yield eased to about 4.13%. The base case set out below, a possible hike, is now the minority scenario; a hold is what the market expects. Source: BLS Employment Situation, June 2026.

Update, June 28, 2026. Since this piece published, the market has started to price a meaningful chance of an earlier move, not just a September one. As of June 27, CME futures implied roughly a 31% chance of a quarter-point hike at the nearer July 29-30 meeting, with about a 69% chance of a hold, alongside the roughly 73% odds of a hike by September discussed below. September is still the base case for the first increase, but July is no longer off the table. These are market-implied probabilities, not Fed decisions, and they will move with every inflation and jobs report between now and each meeting.